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STRICT LIABILITY

FOR EN-

DEFECTS. Badorek v. GeneralMotors
Corp., 11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970)
HANCED INJURIES DUE TO DESIGN

Plaintiff was injured when the car in which she was a passenger was
struck from behind. The gas tank ruptured on impact, and the plaintiff
suffered additional injuries from flaming gasoline. A California court of
appeals affirmed the lower court decision holding General Motors strictly
liable in tort for the enhanced injuries caused by the defectively designed gas tank.'
In early cases, recovery by consumers of defective products was
often frustrated by the requirement of privity of contract.2 The privity
requirement was abolished in the landmark case of MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co 3 MacPherson, however, continued to couch recovery in
terms of a warranty action under sales law. One of the inherent difficulties in applying sales law to consumer transactions was that implied
warranties could be disclaimed, thereby continuing to prevent recovery
by the consumer for injury sustained in the use of a defective product.
The Supreme Court of California recogmzed this problem in Greenman
4 and accordingly adopted the doctrine of strict
v. Yuba Power Products
liability in tort, now embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 402A. Since that time, at least twenty jurisdictions have similarly
recognized the doctrine of strict liability in tort.5
Jurisdictions wich employ the doctrine of strict liability in tort
where a defect has caused injury divide on cases where an injury has
been aggravated, rather than initially caused, by the defect.
In Evans v. General Motors Corp.,8 the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that an automobile manufacturer was not liable for enhanced injuries caused by design defects. 7 The court reasoned that an
1. Badorek v. General Motors Corp., 11 Cal. App. 3d 902, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1970).
2. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consuwner), 69
YALE L.J. 1099 (1960)
The privity doctrine limited the manufacturer's warranty

liability to his immediate purchase. Thus, only a consumer who purchased directly from
the manufacturer obtained the benefit of the warranty
3. 217 N.Y. 382, ill N.E. 1050 (1916). The court in MacPherson held that a manufacturer is under a duty to construct a vehicle free from latent defects and that lack
of privity of contract is not a bar to recovery in an action for breach of warranty
4. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
5. Note, Restricting Disclaimers of the Warranty of Merchantability in Conrzuer
Sales: Proposed Alternatives to the U.C.C., 12 WM. & MARY, L. REv. 895 (1971).
6. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir. 1966)

7. "A manufacturer is not under a duty to make his automobile accident proof or
fool-proof
Perhaps it would be desirable to require manufacturers to construct
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automobile's "intended use" does not include collisions caused by drivers.8 This view was rejected by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
in Larsen v. General Motors Corp.,9 wherein it was held that a product's
defective design may cause an unreasonable risk to the user and therefore the manufacturer should be liable for resulting injury whether
directly. caused or merely aggravated by the defect.' 0
The question of whether the concept of "intended use" includes foreseeable consequences of unintentional rmsuse was presented to a Pennsylvama federal district court in Dyson v. General Motors Corp." The
court held that automobile accidents "are so commonplace as to constitute a readily foreseeable misuse of motor velucles . . . " and that
vehicular collisions are "incidental to the normal and intended use of
motor vehicles on today's highway." 12 Therefore, the court concluded
that a plaintiff who brings himself within the provisions of Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 402A is entitled to recover even when the case is
3
one of enhanced injury.'
The initial problem in Badorek was the foreseeability of injuries en-

hanced by the defective fuel tank.14 The court agreed with Dyson that
automobiles m which it would be safe to collide, but that would be a legislative function, not an aspect of judicial interpretation
" Id. at 824.
8. "The intended purpose of an automobile does not include its participation in collisions with other objects, despite the manufacturer's ability to foresee the possibility
that such collisions may occur." Id. at 825. But see Judge Kiley's strong dissent, id. at
827. Several courts applied the Evans rule on principles of negligence rather than the
doctrine of strict liability See, e.g., Schemel v. General Motors Corp., 384 F.2d 802,
804 (7th Cir. 1967); Schumard v. General Motors Corp., 270 F Supp. 311, 312-13 (SD.
Ohio 1967); Willis v. Chrysler Corp., 264 F Supp. 1010, 1011 (S.D. Tex. 1967).
9. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968).
10. "No rational basis exists for limiting recovery to situations where a defect in
design or manufacture was the causative factor of the accident, as the accident and
resulting injury
are all foreseeable." Id. at 502.
The court apparently accepted the definition of "intended use" as announced in Spruill
v. Boyle-Midway, Inc, 308 F.2d 79, 83-84 (4th Cir. 1962).
"Intended use" is but a convement adaptation of the basic test of "reasonable foreseeability" framed to more specifically fit the factual situations
out of which arise questions of a manufacturer's liability for negligence.
However, [the manufacturer] must also be expected to anticipate the environment which is normal for the use of his product and
he must
anticipate the reasonably foreseeable risks of the use of his product in such
an environment.
Id.
11. 298 F Supp. 1064 (ED. Pa. 1969).
12. Id. at 1072-73.
13. Id.
14. For a discussion of foreseeability see Comment, ForeseeabilityIn Product Design
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highway accidents are indeed foreseeable and with Larsen in allowing
recovery by the party whose injuries are aggravated, rather than caused,

by a defective product.

5

California courts have long been leaders in the development of products liability law,' 6 and the Badorek decision blends in with the case law
progression by California courts toward maximum consumer protection. Badorek represents a logical extension of the strict liability theory
in that it affords compensation to consumers for all types of injuries
caused by defective products. The Badorek court appears to have been
well justified in repudiating the unnecessarily narrow view in Evans

that an automobile's "intended use" does not include collisions. While
an automobile manufacturer is not responsible to its customers merely
because they are so unfortunate as to be involved in an automobile accident, it is quite a different thing when the hapless victim's automobile
becomes a flaming inferno on Impact due to a defective design in the

gas tank. Certainly, the public is justified in expecting maximum protecand Duty to Warn Cases-Distinctionsand Misconceptions, 1968 Wis. L. REv. 228. See
also, Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32
TENN. L. REv. 363, 370-71 (1965).
15.See 11 Cal. App. 3d 302, 90 Cal. Rptr. 305, 317 (1970) adopting the language in
Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495, 502 (8th Cir. 1968)
16. See, e.g., Avner v. Longridge Estates, 272 Cal. App. 2d 607, 77 Cal. Rptr. 633
(1969) (strict liability applied to cutting, grading, and filling of land); Elmore v.
American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 451 P.2d 84, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1969) (strict
liability applied to an injured bystander); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403
P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965) (strict liability applied to property damage); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) (strict
liability applied even though the contract contained a disclaimer clause). See generally,
Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consuner in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9 (1966);
Comment, Manufacturer'sResponsibility for Defective Products, 54 CALIF. L. Rv. 1681
(1966).
The California courts rely heavily on RESTAThMENT (SacoNt) OF TORTS § 402A (1965)
as a basis for their strict liability decisions:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it was sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
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tion from these vehicles in the event of an accident, and any judicial

precedent which holds that accidents, an extremely grim element of our
daily existence, are not "intended uses" of automobiles is unwise and

unrealistic. It is hoped that the Badorek decision, by virtue of its origin
in the California courts, will serve as a ballast to the Larsen view and

will mark a distinct turn against unreasonable refusals to extend the
doctrine of strict liability in tort.
DANIEL

J.

PERRY

Securities Regulation-APPLICATION OF SECTION 16 (b) -BENEFICIAL
OWNERSHIP LIABILITY FOR SHORT-SWING PROFITS. Emerson Electric

Co. v. Reliance Electric Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970).
Emerson Electric Company, which owned no stock in the target
corporation, acquired more than ten percent of Dodge Manufacturing
Corporation's stock on June 16, 1967 1 When its merger efforts failed,
Emerson reduced its Dodge holding to less than ten percent. On September 11, 1967, after Dodge had merged with Reliance Electric Company, Emerson sold the remaining shares to Reliance.2 Emerson msdtuted a declaratory judgment action to determine its liability under secnon 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 for the profits
realized from these two sales.
1. Emerson Electric Co. v. Reliance Electric Co., 434 F.2d 918 (8th Cir. 1970).
Emerson purchased 13.2 percent of Dodge's outstanding stock, a total of 152,282 shares,
at $63 per share. Id. at 920.
2. By the first sale Emerson reduced its holding to 9.96 percent. This sale of 37,000
shares was made on August 28, 1967, at $68 per share. In the second sale which was
completed on September 11, 1967, Reliance paid Emerson $69 per share for the remaining
115,282 shares. Id. at 920.
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 US.C. § 78p(b) (1964)For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may
have been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason
of his relationship to the issuer, any profit realized by hin from any
purchase and sale, or any sale and purchase, of any equity security of such
issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less than
six months, unless such security was acquired in good faith in connection
with a debt previously contracted, shall mure to and be recoverable by the
issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner,
director, or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security
purchased or if not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding
six months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in
equity in any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the
owner of any security of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer
if the issuer shall fail or refuse to bring such suit within sixty days after

